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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 12-1301 
_____________ 
                         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
JOHN J. HUGHES, JR., 
   Appellant                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 1-10-cr-00190-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 07, 2013 
 
Before:  RENDELL, FISHER and JORDAN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: January 9, 2013)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
 This appeal arises from a criminal trial in which Defendant John Hughes, Jr. was 
found guilty of one count of conspiracy to use fire to commit a federal felony and 
interstate transportation of stolen property and one count of interstate transportation of 
. 
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stolen property.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the judgment of conviction 
and sentence. 
I. 
On June 16, 2010, a grand jury in the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned a 
three-count indictment naming Hughes and a co-conspirator, Angel Rodriguez.  The 
indictment charged both with (1) conspiracy to commit arson and interstate transportation 
of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
844(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) interstate transportation of stolen property in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  (App. 26a-29a.)  Hughes entered a plea of “not 
guilty” to each of the three charges on June 22, 2010; Rodriguez entered a plea of not 
guilty on July 13, 2010. 
On January 19, 2011, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment, again 
naming Hughes and Rodriguez as defendants and charging both with three crimes.  (App. 
30a.)  Count I of the superseding indictment charged both with conspiracy to use fire to 
commit a federal felony and interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 371; Count II charged both with use of fire to commit a federal felony in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(h) and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and Count III charged both with 
interstate transportation of stolen property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and 18 U.S.C. 
§2.  (App. 30a-33a.)  On February 22, 2011, Rodriguez entered a plea of guilty to a single 
count of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i).  Hughes, on the other hand, elected to 
go to trial on all three counts pending against him.  On August 3, 2011, Hughes was 
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convicted by a jury on Counts I and III of the superseding indictment, and acquitted on 
Count II. 
At sentencing on January 24, 2012, Hughes argued that he was entitled to credit 
for acceptance of responsibility under the Guidelines because he had only contested the 
counts related to arson, and that he accepted responsibility for the acts underlying the 
theft counts.  The District Court denied his request, noting that “[a]t trial, [Defendant] 
noted to the jury that he was going to accept responsibility for the thefts, but he never 
pled guilty to anything.  He took the case to trial and decided that he was going to roll the 
dice.  I see no acceptance.”  (App. 927a; see also App. 912a-927a.)  Ultimately, Hughes 
was sentenced to a term of 180 months’ imprisonment.  Rodriguez was sentenced to 60 
months’ imprisonment. 
Hughes presents three issues on appeal: (1) that the use-of-fire object of the 
conspiracy count should have been dismissed; (2) that he should have been given credit 
for acceptance of responsibility; and (3) that his sentence was excessive and substantively 
unreasonable.  We will address each argument in turn.   
II. 
A.  Superseding Indictment 
 Hughes argues that Count I of the superseding indictment – conspiracy to use fire 
to commit a federal felony and interstate transportation of stolen property – should have 
been dismissed.  Count I lists two objects, including the use of fire to commit a federal 
felony.  The superseding indictment does not specifically say what “federal felony” 
constituted the underlying offense, however, and he argues that it could be “any number 
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of offenses” and that the indictment “failed to apprise [him] of what he need[ed] to be 
prepared to meet.”  (Br. at 15.)  Thus, Hughes argues that Count I should have been 
dismissed.  His argument fails. 
This Court has plenary review of the sufficiency of the allegations contained in an 
indictment.  United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 594 (3d Cir. 2012).  An indictment must 
set forth the elements of an alleged crime with “sufficient factual orientation” to allow a 
defendant to prepare an adequate defense.  See id. at 596.  We find that the superseding 
indictment at the very least provided Hughes with sufficient notice as to the elements of 
the alleged crime such that the Hughes knew and could prepare for the allegations he 
would have to defend.   
The elements of a charge of conspiracy are (1) a unity of purpose between the 
alleged conspirators; (2) an intent to achieve a common goal; and (3) an agreement to 
work together toward that goal.  United States v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).  The superseding 
indictment named the co-conspirators and set forth the two objects of the conspiracy: 
profiting from the sale of stolen property and concealment of the theft of property 
through setting a fire at a specific location.  (App. 30a.)  Furthermore, the superseding 
indictment specifies the overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy: (1) that the co-
conspirators stole property and inventory from the victim, Americana, and (2) that 
Hughes directed his co-conspirator to set fire to Americana’s building.  (App. 31a.)  In 
other words, the charge explicitly stated that Hughes conspired to use the setting of a fire 
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in furtherance of the felonious conspiracy and the felonious transportation of stolen 
property across state lines. 
As the superseding indictment adequately gave Hughes notice of the elements of 
the crime he was charged with committing, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Hughes’s motion to dismiss Count I of the superseding indictment. 
B.  Acceptance of Responsibility 
Hughes further argues that because the use-of-fire object of the conspiracy should 
be vacated, he actually accepted responsibility for his actions as to all allegations for 
which he was convicted, and is therefore entitled to credit for acceptance of responsibility 
under the Guidelines.  As discussed above, this Court does not find that the use-of-fire 
object of the conspiracy must be vacated.  Furthermore, we do not find that the District 
Court’s denial of his request for credit for acceptance of responsibility was clearly 
erroneous.  A district court’s determination as to a defendant’s acceptance of 
responsibility for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines is “entitled to great deference on 
review” and “may be reversed only if ‘clearly erroneous.’”  United States v. Singh, 923 
F.2d 1039, 1043 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (commentary) (application 
note 5)).  Although conviction by trial does not preclude downward departure for 
acceptance of responsibility, United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2008), 
the district court is in no way obligated to grant downward departure.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm the District Court’s refusal to grant Hughes credit for acceptance of 
responsibility.  
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C.  Reasonableness of the Sentence 
Finally, we address Hughes’s argument that the disparity between his sentence and 
that of his co-conspirator rendered his sentence substantively unreasonable.  (App. 932a-
937a.)  The procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under an 
abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009).  
In this case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hughes to a term 
of imprisonment significantly longer than that of Rodriguez.  As the record shows, the 
District Court compared the relevant facts pertaining to Hughes and Rodriguez, including 
the crimes for which they were convicted, their respective roles in the conspiracy, the 
level of cooperation they offered to the government, and other background facts.  (App. 
942a-943a.)  The record reflects the District Court’s rational and meaningful 
consideration of the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and therefore, we will affirm the 
District Court’s imposition of Hughes’s sentence. 
III. 
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and the 
sentence imposed by the District Court. 
